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EMBRYO FUNDAMENTALISM
June Carbone and Naomi Cahn*
The battle for the future of assisted reproduction technologies (ART) has been
joined.  The tacit compromise underlying assisted reproduction—no laws are passed
that even tangentially sanction embryo destruction and no laws are passed that in-
trude on the profitability of fertility treatments—may be coming to an end.  As use
of ART has increased, so have calls for supervision and oversight.  In the wake of
“Octomom” Nadya Suleman’s use of in vitro fertilization (IVF) to give birth to octu-
plets, the calls to regulate assisted reproduction have become even more pressing in
2009.1  President Obama’s 2009 reversal of the Bush policy on stem cell research
has increased the importance of federal oversight of embryo donations at the same
time that those opposed to embryo destruction have stepped up efforts to preserve
the thousands of unused IVF embryos for reproductive purposes.2  At the same time,
religious communities ambivalent about ART have increased the calls to reform ART
practices to bring them more in line with religious teachings and spiritually informed
notions of human dignity.3
In this paper, we focus on what may become a new flash point in the effort to
craft normative understandings about assisted reproduction.  That flash point is the
treatment of the hundreds of thousands of extra embryos created through in vitro
fertilization (IVF).4  IVF involves extracting eggs from women undergoing fertility
treatment (or sometimes from intended donors), fertilization of the eggs in a labora-
tory, and implantation of the resulting embryos in the intended mother or a gestational
surrogate.  Because the process of extracting human eggs is invasive, painful, and
* June Carbone is the Edward A. Smith-Missouri Chair of Law, the Constitution and
Society at the University of Missouri—Kansas City. Naomi Cahn is the John Theodore Fey
Research Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. We thank Vivian
Hamilton for her support of this project, Lindsey Nelson and Josh Marrone for their research
assistance, and Caitlin Parker for all of her work. Additionally, we thank the other Families,
Fundamentalism & The First Amendment Symposium participants for thought-provoking
discussions.
1 See Naomi R. Cahn & Jennifer M. Collins, Eight is Enough, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 501 (2009), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/
2009/22/LRColl2009n22Cahn&Collins.pdf (discussing the responses to the Suleman case
by state legislators, the media, and others).
2 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Lifts Bush’s Strict Limits on Stem Cell Research,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2009, at A18.
3 See discussion infra notes 115–21 and accompanying text.
4 See Virginia Linn, Pressure On to Limit Eggs in IVF Process, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, July 31, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/05212/546513.stm.
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expensive, doctors extract as many eggs as they can in each attempt.5  To increase
success rates, doctors fertilize all of the eggs, allow them to develop for several days,
and then select the healthiest (generally the most mobile) for implantation.6  To man-
age the risk of birth defects, and the potential impact of multiple births on both mother
and child, doctors prefer to limit the number of embryos implanted at one time.  So
state-of-the-art IVF today routinely produces extra embryos that may never be used.7 
Patients generally freeze the embryos that are not implanted so that they will be avail-
able to produce additional children or for additional attempts if the first effort does not
succeed.8  A large number of patients, however, ultimately choose not to use their
frozen embryos, creating an issue about ultimate disposition.9  The possible choices
often offered are to thaw and discard the embryos, donate them for research, or donate
them for reproductive purposes.10  Each of the three options would take place more
readily, however, if the law were to clarify the legal status of embryos, the mecha-
nisms by which their progenitors could discard or transfer them to others, and the
obligations of third parties involved in the process.  And therein lies the rub.
The status of embryos, which involves profound religious and philosophical dif-
ferences and which has become the subject of entrenched political differences over
the course of the abortion fight, lies at the heart of these developments.  On one side
of the debate is what we term “embryo fundamentalism,” that is, the insistence that
embryos are unique human beings from the moment of conception, and should be
respected as such.11  On the other side of the debate are those who would define the
status of embryos in terms of the differing values their progenitors confer on them.12 
5 See Nicholas Wade, Clinics Hold More Embryos Than Had Been Thought, N.Y. TIMES,
May 9, 2003, at A24. For an overview of what the in vitro fertilization process entails, see
Reproductive Fertility Center, IVF Patient Overview, http://www.reproductivefertilitycenter
.com/rfc/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=69&Itemid=71 (last visited Apr. 17,
2010). For further discussion of embryo issues, see NAOMI R. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES:
WHY THE FERTILITY MARKET NEEDS LEGAL REGULATION (2009); Cahn & Collins, supra
note 1, at 502–03 (discussing recent proposals to regulate the IVF industry).
6 In high risk cases, the doctors may conduct preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD)
to screen the embryos for disease or other characteristics. See Fertility LifeLines, Assisted
Reproductive Technologies: Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, http://www.fertilitylifelines
.com/fertilitytreatments/pgd.jsp (last visited Apr. 17, 2010). Some parents elect to use ART
to select an embryo that carries the parents’ disorder. See Jaime King, Duty to the Unborn: A
Response to Smolensky, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 377, 379–80 (2008).
7 See infra notes 56–60 and accompanying text.
8 See id.
9 See id.
10 See Britney Glaser, The Fertility Dilemma: Frozen Embryos, KPLCTV, Mar. 27, 2009,
http://www.kplctv.com/Global/story.asp?S=10081861; Anne Drapkin Lyerly et al., Fertility
Patients’ Views About Frozen Embryo Disposition: Results of a Multi-Institutional U.S. Survey,
93 FERTILITY & STERILITY 499 (2010).
11 See infra notes 64–67 and accompanying text.
12 See Katheryn D. Katz, The Legal Status of the Ex Utero Embryo: Implications for
Adoption Law, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 303, 306 (2006) (outlining different views on the moral
2010] EMBRYO FUNDAMENTALISM 1017
Indeed, studies show that most of the patients who currently participate in IVF have
multiple approaches to the meaning of the embryos they have created.13  Embryo
fundamentalists, in contrast, include both some who are opposed to IVF entirely as
inconsistent with human dignity and others who might embrace ART if the process
were remade to reflect their values.
The conflicts between these groups accordingly have both symbolic and practical
implications.  The symbolic clash involves an extension of the abortion fight into the
disposition of the hundreds of thousands of frozen embryos in clinic freezers.  Pro-
posals are multiplying to permit, and in many cases encourage, their transfer for repro-
ductive purposes.14  At the same time, surveys show a majority of IVF patients would
like to transfer their leftover embryos for research purposes.15  And the clinics that
store them would like greater direction on their disposition, if only to avoid the con-
tinuing storage costs for embryos unlikely to be used for other purposes.16
The symbolic clash addresses embryo status and the issue of whether the state
should treat embryos as human life from the moment of conception or as human
cells subject to the wishes of those who create them.  Yet, these differences need not
necessarily affect existing ART practices.  Indeed, Louisiana enacted a statute that
treats embryos from the point of conception until implantation in a woman’s body
as “juridical persons” entitled to equal respect.17  Georgia has enacted provisions to
facilitate embryo transfer that use the language of adoption and adoption-like pro-
cedures as part of the process.18  The fertility industry, which successfully blocked
proposed legislation to limit the number of embryos that could be implanted at one
status of embryos); Paul D. Simmons, Perspectives: Protestant, THE RELIGIOUS COALITION
FOR REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE, http://www.rcrc.org/perspectives/protestant.cfm (highlighting
Protestant perspective on reproductive issues); see also Angela K. Upchurch, A Postmodern
Deconstruction of Frozen Embryo Disputes, 39 CONN. L. REV. 2107 (2007) (utilizing post-
modern critique to explore questions surrounding frozen embryo disputes).
13 See, e.g., Lyerly, supra note 10; Denise Grady, Parents Torn Over Extra Frozen
Embryos From Fertility Procedures, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2008, at A26.
14 See infra Part IV.
15 See Lyerly, supra note 10, at 506 (“Consistent with single-site studies from Europe
and Australia, donation for research was the most popular option for disposition of excess
embryos.”).
16 See id. at 500 (“[D]elayed decisions create difficulties for the providers who are respon-
sible for safe storage or disposition of apparently abandoned embryos.”).
17 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:125 (2009) (“An in vitro fertilized human ovum as a juridical
person is recognized as a separate entity apart from the medical facility or clinic where it is
housed or stored.”).
18 GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-41 (2009); see Steven Ertelt, Georgia State House Passes
Embryo Adoption Bill to Protect Unborn Children, LIFENEWS, Mar. 13, 2009, http://www
.lifenews.com/bio2793.html. Use of the term “adoption” for embryo transfers is yet another
symbol of the morally contested terrain and the complexities of language. See Sarah B.
Lawsky & Naomi Cahn, Embryo Exchanges and Adoption Tax Credits, 122 TAX NOTES
1365 (2009) [hereinafter Lawsky & Cahn].
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time,19 did not oppose these proposals because clinics in these states do not destroy
existing embryos in any event, and the new legislation would not otherwise restrict
IVF practices.20  Like mandatory sonograms, parental consent, waiting periods, and
restrictions on late term abortions, these measures underscore fealty to a particular
moral viewpoint, although they have not necessarily triggered a backlash from politi-
cally powerful opponents.
The creation of a legal infrastructure to encourage embryo transfers is another
matter.  The demand for fertility services is growing.  To date, IVF users have over-
whelmingly been relatively wealthy and better educated.21  College educated women
have experienced the greatest delay in family formation, hence the greatest age-related
fertility issues.22  Moreover, the lack of public funding for fertility services has limited
the benefits to those of independent means.23  And, of course, those opposed to IVF
per se have had little reason to participate in the creation of the industry.  The result
is an industry with a small, but affluent and politically powerful clientele that has
flourished with relatively little oversight.
All of these factors may be changing.  The average age of first birth is increasing
for the country as a whole.24  Adoptions have become harder to come by, and inter-
national adoptions, which have filled some of the gap, have declined as the supplier
nations have imposed more restrictions.25  The adoption of legal measures facilitat-
ing embryo transfer for reproductive purposes may accordingly take root, not only
to object to the ethical practices of others, but to create new networks for assisted
reproduction—and ultimately for the recreation of family life.
The result raises a series of far reaching questions about the relationship between
legal infrastructure and moral understandings.26  To date, ART generally and IVF
in particular have developed with a minimum of public scrutiny and with practices
19 See Press Release, Resolve, The National Infertility Association and Supporters Defeat
Dangerous Georgia Bill (Apr. 9, 2009), available at http://www.resolve.org/site/PageServer
?pagename=fmed_mccpr040809.
20 See Ertelt, supra note 18.
21 See Dena S. Davis, The Puzzle of IVF, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 275, 289–90
(2006).
22 See NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES (2010); see
also Sara McLanahan, Diverging Destinies: How Children Are Faring Under the Second
Demographic Transition, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 607, 607–09 (2004) (finding that college educated
women have experienced the greatest delay in age of child-rearing).
23 Davis, supra note 21, at 289–90.
24 See NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
NCHS DATA BRIEF NO. 21, MORE WOMEN ARE HAVING THEIR FIRST CHILD LATER IN LIFE
(2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db21.pdf (detailing rise in average
age for first birth to 25).
25 See LESLIE HARRIS, JUNE R. CARBONE & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, FAMILY LAW 1004 (4th
ed. 2009).
26 See Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close Look
at Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035 (2002).
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that proceed from the interaction of physicians committed to IVF and patients who
seek out their services.27
Two pieces of legislation have nonetheless had far reaching effects.  The first is
a federal statute that requires reporting clinic success rates, which has meant the U.S.
industry, to a much greater degree than elsewhere, values successful pregnancies.  In
turn, this creates more emphasis on techniques such as longer in vitro development
that select for healthier embryos and greater resistance to restrictions, such as those
on the number of embryos implanted, that might result in lower success rates.28  The
second, state legislation in California that created a comprehensive legal infrastructure
for embryo transfer, has also helped to create an ethic of donation.29  The legislation
facilitates embryo transfer for research purposes, establishing a registry, specifying
consent forms, and clarifying the status and responsibilities of donors, donees, and
fertility clinics.30  This legislation, which was designed to help spur stem cell research,
also facilities embryo donation for reproductive purposes, and embryo “adoption”
clinics appear to be flourishing in the state.31
Additional legislation in Louisiana, Georgia and Oklahoma may similarly en-
courage creation of alternative networks for embryo transfers.32  The result could be
new reproductive practices that reconcile IVF procedures with a greater variety of
religious beliefs, facilitating family formation at later ages for a larger part of the
population.33  The development of such a legal infrastructure—and the creation of a
new constituency for IVF—might then create greater support for assisted reproduc-
tion and break the log jam that has prevented regulation designed to promote safety
and effectiveness.
Alternatively, of course, the result could be to create a fundamentalist infrastruc-
ture for the oversight of assisted reproduction to the exclusion of other views, includ-
ing the views of the majority of the population.  The Catholic Church, for example,
which has led in the development of a comprehensive theological approach to the
treatment of embryos as human beings, rejects the acceptability of IVF generally, and
the use of IVF to create extra embryos in particular.34  Yet, legislating these views,
which would either restrict the availability of IVF or preclude some of the practices
that increase success rates, would be far more controversial than either the symbolic
act of declaring embryos to be “juridical persons” or the practical one of encouraging
embryo transfer networks using the rhetoric of adoption.
27 See infra notes 121–32 and accompanying text.
28 See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
29 See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
30 See id.
31 See, e.g., Tracey Garcia, Snowflake Program Matches Families, Embryos, PASADENA
STAR-NEWS, Feb. 28, 2009, http://www.pasadenastarnews.com/news/ci_11807959.
32 See infra Part IV. A–C.
33 See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 22.
34 See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
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In this Article, we consider where such nascent regulatory efforts are likely to
take us, examining in particular:
1. The differences in approaches to ART regulation involving fundamen-
talist principles, which treat embryos as humans from the moment of
conception, versus more secular approaches that defer to the values of
the progenitors;
2. The inherent tensions in a fundamentalist approach that encourages
embryo transfer for reproductive purposes before working through the
acceptability of IVF practices;
3. The potential for the creation of fundamentalist friendly ART regulation;
4. The likely impact of these differing approaches on the future develop-
ment of the industry, given the ease of fertility tourism, cross-border
clinic selection, and the recreation of political battle lines; and,
5. The potential redefinition of constitutionally protected reproductive rights
and family integrity.
In undertaking this analysis, we start with the factors driving “embryo fundamen-
talism.” We will explain the rise of a more polarized political discourse around moral
issues, and the role of that polarization in giving voice to the most fundamentalist
positions on reproduction.  We will then describe the different positions underlying
the moral status of embryos and how these positions fit within the larger national
political discourse.  We will provide a detailed comparison of existing legislation
that governs disposition of the embryos created in IVF, comparing the approaches
of California, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Georgia.  We will end with consideration
of how the new legislation may shape the future development of an industry still
largely in its infancy.
I. CONTESTED DISCOURSES AND EMBRYO ETHICS
The fight over the future of assisted reproduction may depend on the status of
embryos.  Janet Dolgin writes that the idea of embryos began as a normatively “neutral
term” in contrast to use of the words “fetus” or “baby.”35  It became politically con-
tested terrain with its association with the “culture wars.”36
Nonetheless, assisted reproduction itself, despite the use of fertility enhancing
drugs and other techniques that pose potential health risks to mother and children,
has received relatively little scrutiny.37
35 Janet L. Dolgin, Surrounding Embryos: Biology, Ideology, and Politics, 16 HEALTH
MATRIX 27 (2006).
36 Id. at 27.
37 Lars Noah writes that “[o]ne could criticize some of the existing academic commentary
as engaging in little more than bioethical parlor games. . . . Unfortunately, some of the more
fundamental questions about the safety of different techniques and how best to control those
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The legal status of embryos has been addressed in one context: disputes over the
disposition of frozen embryos when couples divorce.38  In these cases, the male pro-
genitor has opposed use of the embryos for reproductive purposes, while the female
progenitor, who is more likely to see the fertilized eggs as her only opportunity to pro-
duce biologically related offspring, has wanted to implant them.39  Every court to rule
on the issue has prohibited implantation even when the couple had signed an agreement
that would have allowed it.40  The courts have recognized embryos in this context as
something other than rights-bearing human beings, and concluded that the male interest
in preventing “involuntary” parenthood outweighed the partner’s desire for offspring.41 
Though some have argued that embryos are human lives and should be implanted if
one of the progenitors wishes to do so, courts in states as conservative as Tennessee42
risks have received less scrutiny. In fact, the controversy over human cloning has perhaps
prematurely left unanswered lingering but hardly inconsequential questions about the now
relatively lower-tech ARTs.” Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls
of Unregulated Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 606 (2003). For even more scath-
ing criticism of the failure to interrogate the use of fertility enhancing drugs, see Michele
Goodwin, Prosecuting the Womb, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1657, 1724–25 (2008). Goodwin
observes that “[r]esearchers prodigiously document how ovaries may be stressed by undergoing
cycles to release numerous eggs, many times more than that produced in a normal, one-month
ovulation cycle. According to one commentator, some researchers are concerned about the
stress ovaries endure through aggressive hyper-stimulation procedures to produce more eggs,
warning that ‘stimulating them, with drugs like Clomid or Pergonal, to produce more eggs
could cause more stress, perhaps damaging ovaries.’” Id.  She also cites research suggesting
a link between fertility drugs and cancer in both patients and fetuses. Id. at 1725.
38 See, e.g., A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
39 Id.
40 See id.; Davis, supra note 21, at 287 & n.86 (suggesting that Louisiana might rule
otherwise); see also In re Marriage of Witten III, 672 N.W.2d 768, 783 (Iowa 2003) (“[N]o
transfer, release, disposition, or use of the embryos can occur without the signed authorization
of both donors. If a stalemate results, the status quo would be maintained. The practical effect
will be that the embryos are stored indefinitely unless both parties can agree to destroy the
fertilized eggs.”); A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1059 (“In this case, we are asked to decide whether the
law of the Commonwealth may compel an individual to become a parent over his or her con-
temporaneous objection. The husband signed this consent form in 1991. Enforcing the form
against him would require him to become a parent over his present objection to such an under-
taking. We decline to do so.”). For an examination of these disputes, see Upchurch, supra
note 12, at 2110–11.
41 See Tracey S. Pachman, Disputes Over Frozen Preembryos & the “Right Not to be a
Parent,” 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 128, 131 (2003).
42 See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). Indeed, the Davis court observed that
“preembryos are not, strictly speaking, either ‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but occupy an interim
category that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human life. It follows
that any interest that Mary Sue Davis and Junior Davis have in the preembryos in this case
is not a true property interest. However, they do have an interest in the nature of ownership, to
the extent that they have decision-making authority concerning disposition of the preembryos,
within the scope of policy set by law.” Id. at 597.
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and Texas43 have held otherwise, and the decisions have encountered relatively little
opposition from anti-abortion groups.44
A series of authors have attempted to address why abortion—and the female
interest in similarly avoiding involuntary parenthood45—has become so much more
intense an issue in contrast, and why that intensity seems to be increasing.  The con-
ventional wisdom, created through the pioneering work of Kristin Luker46 and ex-
tended in the legal context by Janet Dolgin47 and Reva Siegel and Robert Post,48 is that
abortion rose to political prominence only when it became associated with tension
over changing family norms.  These authors argue that while the debate about abortion
is framed as a debate about the status of embryonic and fetal life, it is also “a last stand
for the preservation of traditional family life and the values and beliefs that sus-
tained that form of family.”49  Writing during the period in the 1980s when President
Reagan was putting together a conservative coalition and trying to recruit Protestant
evangelicals, Luker emphasized the importance of conventional gender roles to anti-
abortion women’s sense of place and the threat pro-life forces felt from the challenge
to traditional sexual mores and the changing nature of the family.50
Over time, however, the fight against abortion has assumed a life of its own, one
focused much more single-mindedly on the status of the fetus as the basis for the
moral outrage associated with abortion.  Dolgin writes, “pro-life adherents are more
reluctant than ever to compromise their position with regard to fetal and embryonic
status.  Their rhetoric, their tactics, and their underlying agenda all have come to de-
pend increasingly on the notion that abortion constitutes murder because fetuses and
embryos are people.”51
As the movement has become more intense and more focused on fetal status,
embryo fundamentalism, as we have termed it, is less likely to be limited to abortion. 
Indeed, over the last decade, the same insistence on absolutism has shaped the debate
over embryonic stem cell research.52  This research involves extracting pluripotent
43 Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 41–42 (Tex. App. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct.
1662 (2008).
44 But see Teresa Stanton Collett, Whose Life Is It Anyway?: Texas Public Policy and
Contracts to Kill Embryonic Children, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 371 (2009) (criticizing Roman
opinion).
45 The contrast is striking, of course, because in the case of IVF the embryos could only
have been created through activities designed to produce a child. No one engages in IVF, after
all, because they were swept away by the passion of the moment.
46 KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION & THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984).
47 Janet L. Dolgin, Embryonic Discourse: Abortion, Stem Cells, and Cloning, 31 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 101 (2003).
48 Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash,
42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007).
49 See Dolgin, supra note 47, at 130.
50 LUKER, supra note 46, at 197–202.
51 Dolgin, supra note 47, at 132–33.
52 See Dolgin, supra note 47, for a comparison of the two issues.
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stem cells, which have the potential to develop into any part of the body, from an
embryo during an early stage of development, thereby destroying the embryo.53  While
the opposition to stem cell research has been every bit as adamant as the opposition
to abortion in some quarters, it has never commanded as much support among the
public as a whole because it lacks a connection to traditional family values.  Public
opinion polls show that sixty-two percent of the American public finds embryonic
stem cell research to be morally acceptable, compared to only thirty percent opposed.54 
On the issue of government funding, however, fifty-seven percent of Republicans
favor restrictions while Democrats and Independents are opposed.55  The issue accord-
ingly appeals to embryo fundamentalists even if it does not command the same degree
of support as anti-abortion politics generally.
In vitro fertilization, however, may present the issue of fetal status—and thus
trigger embryo fundamentalism—in starker terms.  Under current practices, IVF will
almost inevitably produce excess embryos.  The average IVF cycle produces as many
as seven extra embryos that are not used.56  Moreover, while a few clinics will work
with couples who want to implant all of the embryos produced, many will not for
fear that the practice will lower their success rates or that implantation will result in
multiple births, endangering the health of the mother and resulting children .57
The number of leftover embryos in the United States is estimated to be approxi-
mately 500,000.58  When people are asked what they would like to do with their leftover
embryos, their responses include deciding to save the embryos for their own further
use, donate them to another couple, donate them for medical research, destroy them,
or keep them “in frozen limbo.”59  Davis suggests that “the more these stored embryos
come to seem like children to their ‘parents,’ the less willing the ‘parents’ are to donate
them to infertile couples and to imagine their children growing up in unknown circum-
stances.”60  As they contemplate these options, couples may be frozen with paralysis,
unable to decide what to do, “waiting on an epiphany that never comes.”61
53 See id. at 105.
54 Lymari Morales, Majority of Americans Likely Support Stem Cell Decision, GALLOP,
Mar. 9, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/116485/majority-americans-likely-support-stem
-cell-decision.aspx.
55 Id.
56 Julia Duin, Vatican Condemns Cloning, In Vitro; Document Outlines Biomedical Ethics,
WASH. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2008, at A1.
57 Davis, supra note 21, at 278 & nn.19–20 (citing the Cleveland Clinic as an example
of a clinic that will implant all embryos produced).
58 Bob Smietana, Leftover Embryos Lie in Frozen Limbo, THE TENNESSEAN, Apr. 5, 2009.
59 Id.
60 Davis, supra note 21, at 280 (citing Sheryl de Lacey, Parent Identity and “Virtual”
Children: Why Patients Discard Rather than Donate Unused Embryos, 20 HUM. REPROD.
1661, 1665 (2005)).
61 Laura Bell, What is the Fate of Leftover Frozen Embryos, PARENTING (Aug. 27, 2009),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32489239/ns/today-parenting_and_family/. “In a recent survey
of 58 couples, researches from the University of California in San Francisco found that 72
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Or consider another study of one thousand couples, which found:
54% of respondents with cryopreserved embryos were very likely
to use them for reproduction, 21% were very likely to donate
for research, 7% or fewer were very likely to choose any other
option.  Respondents who ascribed high importance to concerns
about the health or well-being of the embryo, fetus, or future child
were more likely to thaw and discard embryos or freeze them
indefinitely.62
These attitudes suggest that couples undergoing IVF will inevitably produce a large
number of embryos that will never be implanted,63 and that their decisions reflect not
callous indifference, but profound concern about the fate of the embryos.
IVF practices are accordingly on a collision course with embryo fundamentalism. 
The Catholic Church and other religious groups have misgivings about IVF generally. 
Yet, the anti-abortion movement as a whole has not mobilized against IVF;64 its
focus has been on the embryos.  For those who believe that the cluster of cells are
not just the potential for life, but akin to a living child, the indefinite freezing, much
less destruction, of embryos is anathema.  Consider this quote from the Journal of
Markets and Morality:
Christians and defenders of human dignity who acknowledge
embryos to be preborn persons have a dual responsibility to pro-
tect the innocent and also to do no harm.  The stakes are high be-
cause, as Ron Stoddart founder of Nightlight Christian Adoptions
percent were undecided about the fate of their stored embryos . . . . Couples have held on to
embryos for five years or more.” Id.
62 See Lyerly, supra note 10, at 499.
63 Anne Drapkin Lyerly et al., Factors That Affect Infertility Patients’ Decisions About
Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 85 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1623 (2006).
64 See, e.g., Davis, supra note 21, at 292 (“[W]hile the embryo in the abortion context is,
as Dolgin shows, a stand-in or replacement for concerns about family life and structure, the
embryo in the context of IVF exists primarily to allow married, heterosexual, economically
stable couples to ‘complete’ their families by having children.”). On the other hand, we sus-
pect that the majority of the public has simply not focused on the issue and IVF itself has not
crystallized as a constituent of political identity. Many religions other than the Catholic Church
do not have a strong position on it and pro-life forces (including pro-life Catholics) view IVF
as secondary to other concerns. See, e.g., discussion of Nadya Suleman, a.k.a. the “Octomom,”
with anti-abortion blogger Jill Stanek asserting, “Finally, about Octomom. Pro-lifers differ
on the morality of IVF. But most agree children should not purposefully be born into a single
parent home.” Dan Gilgoff, Are Opponents of Embryonic Stem Cell Research Using Octo-
Mom as a Poster Girl?, US NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 16, 2010, available at http://www
.usnews.com/blogs/god-and-country/2009/03/13/are-opponents-of-embryonic-stem-cell
-research-using-octo-mom-as-a-poster-girl.html.
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stresses, “[a]n embryo is not a potential human life—it is human
life with potential.”65
Christians who share these views are calling for the “rescue” of these human lives
with potential from their deep freezes.  Thus, Nightlight Christian Adoptions de-
clares on its website that “[i]n 1997, Nightlight began the Snowflakes Frozen Embryo
Adoption Program, which is helping some of the more than 400,000 frozen embryos
realize their ultimate purpose—life—while sharing the hope of a child with an infertile
couple.”66  The appropriation of the language of life—putting the face of a child on
the cells in the deep freeze—moves ART practices from the privacy of market-based
services into the political arena.67
II. ABORTION TSUNAMIS AND POLITICAL SALIENCE
The staying power of the pro-life movement rests with a shift away from its
identification with the moral attributes of the traditional family per se and toward an
insistence on the personhood of the fetus.68  Some scholars associate the power of
that shift with the ability to personalize the embryo, to use ultrasound to show fetal
development in utero, and to capture the imagination of the public.69  Other scholars,
however, explain the appeal of abortion politics in terms of its moral clarity—and the
ideological reorganization of American politics.70  This analysis suggests that it is the
very absolutism and intrinsic divisiveness of the abortion issue that creates its political
power and that the importance of embryo fundamentalism depends on whether it can
harness the same motivations.
Few debate the intrinsic divisiveness of abortion—at least as it has been cast in
recent political debate.  Either the union of egg and sperm marks the beginning of
life and destruction of the resulting embryo is murder or the moment of conception
65 Stephen J. Grabill, Evangelicals and Embryo Adoption, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE,
Sept. 8, 2006, http://legacy.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20060908/news_lz1e8grabill.html.
66 Nightlight Christian Adoption Homepage, http://www.nightlight.org/adoption-services/
snowflakes-embryo/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
67 See, e.g., Jennifer Baker, Comment, A War of Words: How Fundamentalist Rhetoric
Threatens Reproductive Autonomy, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 671 (2009). For a thoughtful exploration
of some of the issues involving moral values and money, see Kimberly D. Krawiec, Show
Me the Money: Making Markets in Forbidden Exchanges: Sunny Samaritans and Egomaniacs:
Price-Fixing in the Gamete Market, 72 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROB. 59 (2009).
68 Janet L. Dolgin et al., Attitudes About Human Embryos, Embryonic Stem Cell Research,
and Related Matters, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 319, 322–23 (2008).
69 See id.; see also Davis, supra note 21, at 291.
70 Indeed, Dolgin observes that for the Catholic Church during the nineteenth century,
“opposing abortion was part of a more general opposition to modernization. At stake was the
future of a venerable universe of power and belief. That universe was grounded in faith; it
prized hierarchy and status and it frowned upon autonomous choice for almost everyone.”
Dolgin, supra note 47, at 117.
1026 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 18:1015
constitutes one step among many on the way to reproduction and the embryo’s status
depends on its importance in the eyes of its progenitors.  Indeed, the very act of stating
the issue in such terms—between an absolute standard and a contextual one—triggers
deep divisions that go beyond the issue of abortion itself.
Despite this, religious views on the origin of life vary considerably, and a majority
of the American people favors intermediate positions on abortion.71  Moreover, while
the issue has always been controversial, it has not always been political.  Instead, the
overlap of polarized public opinion with legislative partisanship on abortion is rela-
tively new, and reflects the ideological realignment of the major parties.72
In describing the forces driving polarization in political life, political science
research considers the extent to which values preferences align with partisan identity,
political rhetoric, religious participation, and other forms of group membership.73 
We have argued at length elsewhere that the more these factors correspond and re-
inforce each other, the deeper the divisions; the more these different sources of con-
victions and identity crosscut each other, the easier to craft political compromises.74 
The result produces a tsunami effect: waves that reinforce each other reach greater
heights with lower troughs between them.
A growing literature considers the extent to which political positions correspond
to values preferences.  These studies differ in their hypotheses as to the source of the
differences, and they do not necessarily use the same vocabulary in describing them. 
Nonetheless, the major studies appear to produce similar results in finding divisions
between those who are attracted to absolute values and those who see the world in
terms of contextual decision-making.75  These studies complement older political analy-
ses that tied political orientation to traits such as openness and conscientiousness.76 
71 See Lydia Saad, More Americans “Pro-Life” Than “Pro-Choice” for First Time,
GALLUP, May 15, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/118399/more-americans-pro-life-than
-pro-choice-first-time.aspx (while 51% of Americans identify themselves as pro-life, 53%
of Americans think abortions should be legal but only under certain circumstances).
72 See Delia Baldassarri & Andrew Gelman, Partisans Without Constraint: Political
Polarization and Trends in American Public Opinion, 114 AM. J. SOC. 408, 410 (2008).
73 For a summary of the political science literature, see id. (finding polarization on moral
issues largely non-existent forty years ago, greater polarization today on moral issues among
the better educated and the more politically active and polarization on moral issues increasing
much more dramatically since the mid-eighties). See also MORRIS P. FIORINA, SAMUEL J.
ABRAMS & JEREMY C. POPE, CULTURE WAR? THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA 37–49
(2005) (disputing the polarization thesis and maintaining that public attitudes have been re-
markably stable); John H. Evans, Have Americans’ Attitudes Become More Polarized?—An
Update, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 71, 87–89 (2003) (concluding that activists have become more partisan
and polarized on values issues).
74 This section is adapted from the analysis in CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 22, ch. 4.
See also Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Deep Purple: Religious Shades of Family Law, 110
W. VA. L. REV. 459, 465 (2007).
75 See Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 122–24 (2007).
76 John T. Jost, The End of the End of Ideology, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 651, 651 (2006).
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Linguist George Lakoff argues that the differences in worldviews correspond to
different rhetorical styles and openness to different types of arguments.77
This analysis suggests that not only do anti-abortion stances appeal more to those
inclined toward absolutist world views, but also that those same people are less likely
to favor access to abortion by teens or the unmarried for reasons that may not be in-
trinsic to the issue of abortion itself.78
A preference for more absolutist versus more contextualist political perspectives,
or for traditional values versus more modernist values, does not automatically trans-
late, however, into particular political positions.  Instead, public views on particular
issues are mediated by religious, political and other loyalties, which may undercut
or reinforce each other.
Before the 1980s, abortion in the U.S. was viewed as a largely Catholic issue.79 
The Catholic Church then, as now, staked out a strict position on conception as the
beginning of life and made abortion a frequent topic of Sunday sermons.80  Post and
Siegel report that the political dynamics of the issue shifted in the eighties when
Protestant churches reframed the abortion question in terms of changing gender roles
and family values.81  Once the issue became less associated with Catholic teaching,
and more with the concerns Lakoff and Dolgin identify about the ability to defy con-
ventional teachings on marriage and sexuality, opposition to abortion attracted greater
support across sectarian lines.82
This analysis suggests that part of what has taken place in politics is a “resorting”
in which those drawn toward more absolutist values, who in most eras are likely to
be conservative and to attend church regularly, have also become more likely in the
77 GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK 3
(2002). For views that cultural styles and values, with or without a genetic component, also
affect political perceptions and make divisions relatively impervious to fact based arguments,
see Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan & James Grimmelmann, Modeling Facts, Culture, and
Cognition in the Gun Debate, 18 SOC. JUST. RES. 283 (2005); Dan M. Kahan & Donald
Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 163 (2006).
See generally The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, http://www.cultural
cognition.net/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
78 “Most liberals begin with the premise that teenagers should not have babies . . . while
most conservatives begin with the premise [that single teenagers] should not have sex.” News
Release, Stanford University News Service, Teen Pregnancy: Economics More Important
Than Age (Oct. 20, 1993), available at http://news.stanford.edu/pr/93/931020Arc3093.html
(quoting Stanford University Law Professor Deborah Rhode).
79 For a discussion of the political transformation of this issue, see Post & Siegel, supra
note 48, at 412–23.
80 For a discussion of the Catholic position on abortion, see TIMOTHY A. BYRNES,
CATHOLIC BISHOPS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 54–57 (1991) (suggesting that Roe helped
mobilize Catholic bishops because it moved abortion politics from state legislatures onto a
national political agenda).
81 See Post & Siegel, supra note 48, at 415–17.
82 See id. at 415.
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modern era to vote Republican.  Conversely, those who tend to be more contextualist
in their decision-making, more egalitarian than hierarchical in their value preferences,
more open to different choices, and less judgmental about others, are more likely in
the modern era not to attend church and to vote Democratic, rather than simply to
be more liberal members of a given party or congregation.83  As these influences
reinforce each other, Republicans have become more adamant in their anti-abortion
policies, and anti-abortion positions have become more closely associated with more
traditionalist religious denominations.84  Three important constituents of identity—a
preference for absolutes, religious identity, and political loyalty—thus overlap, and co-
incide with a greater ability to choose congregations, neighborhoods, cable TV chan-
nels, and internet sites that reinforce the views and the values associated with them.85 
Bill Bishop argues that the more people associate with those who think the same way
they do, the more intense and extreme the convictions become.86  Political scientists
Baldassarri and Gelman conclude that: “Political polarization constitutes a threat to
the extent that it induces alignment along multiple lines of potential conflict and orga-
nizes individuals and groups around exclusive identities, thus crystallizing interests
into opposite factions.”87
These developments, which reflect a much broader political realignment than
simply a shift on abortion, frame the context for the emergence of the pro-life move-
ment, with its efforts to make the fetus into a child, as a political force in the modern
era.  This makes compromise (and perhaps even reasoned discourse) less likely.  Some
of the developments reflect a self-conscious political strategy, a strategy made pos-
sible in part by the fact that emotions about abortion are not exactly parallel.  As polls
indicate, those opposed to abortion are less inclined to compromise than those who
favor its legality (and, of course, those attracted to absolutist positions are less inclined
to compromise than those who see political issues on a continuum).88  Expressing
83 Michael Hout and Claude S. Fischer, for example, hypothesize that the percentage of
people listing “no religion” in public opinion polls doubled in the nineties in reaction to the
growing identification of religion with conservative politics. Michael Hout & Claude S.
Fischer, Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference: Politics and Generations, 67
AM. SOC. REV. 165, 166, 188–89 (2002). Nonetheless, religious attendance rather than denomi-
national identity tends to provide the most robust predictor of attitudes toward abortion. Indeed,
frequent church attendees are likely to oppose abortion even if they attend relatively liberal
churches who do not oppose abortion on religious grounds. See Ted G. Jelen & Clyde Wilcox,
Causes and Consequences of Public Attitudes Toward Abortion: A Review and Research
Agenda, 56 POL. RES. Q. 489, 492–93 (2003).
84 See also BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT 27 (2008) (In 2006, sixty-nine percent of
Democrats were strongly pro-choice compared to twenty-one percent of Republicans).
85 Bishop notes for example that historically political loyalty did not correspond with
church attendance. Id. at 82.
86 Id. at 72–77.
87 Baldassarri & Gelman, supra note 72, at 409.
88 Survey Report, The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Support for
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opposition to abortion is thus necessary to hold those who see abortion as an all or
nothing political issue.  At the same time, imposing some restrictions on abortion
need not necessarily offend the majority who favor making abortion legal, a group
that is less likely to view the issue in absolute terms.  Psychologist Drew Westen de-
scribes the Republican political response in these terms, observing that it has been
“unequivocal: describe abortion as murder, define an uncompromising stance as the
only moral stance one could take, get the 30 percent of Americans with the least toler-
ance for ambiguity on moral questions to the polls, and let the Democrats offer dozens
of different positions.”89
Finally, intriguing research finds that while elite and mass polarization reinforce
each other, the more powerful influence may be that of party leaders on the public. 
A study of Florida legislators, for example, reported that the individual characteristics
of legislators, not the characteristics of voters in the district, best predicted votes on
abortion-related issues.90  Other work indicates that the increase in polarization among
party activists is the most likely driving force producing greater polarization among
both party leaders and the public.91  Almost all observers agree that the result has been
destruction of the center in Congress, and in many state legislatures.92  Accordingly,
while centrist leaders might diffuse contentious issues such as those surrounding
abortion, most legislators in today’s more partisan political environment emphasize
positions opposed to compromise.93
III. LAW, THE SEARCH FOR BABIES AND THE CREATION OF AN INDUSTRY
Fertility politics, of course, are not necessarily abortion politics, but the regulation
of in vitro fertilization, at least when it intersects with embryo fundamentalism, could
recreate some of the same alliances.  The pro-life movement, having staked out an
Abortion Slips: Issue Ranks Lower on the Agenda (Oct. 1, 2009), available at http://people
-press.org/report/549/support-for-abortion-slips.
89 Drew Westen, THE POLITICAL BRAIN: THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN DECIDING THE FATE
OF THE NATION 178 (2007).
90 Jelen & Wilcox, supra note 83, at 495 (citing David Schecter, What Drives the Voting
on Abortion Policy? Investigating Partisanship and Religion in the State Legislative Arena,
23 WOMEN & POL. 61, 74–77 (2001)).
91 Geoffrey C. Layman, Thomas M. Carsey, & Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Party Polari-
zation In American Politics: Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences, 9 ANN. REV. POL.
SCI. 83, 104 (2006).
92 Bill Bishop, for example, reports that from the end of World War II through the seven-
ties, between thirty-five percent and forty-five percent of Congress would have been con-
sidered moderates, while today only ten percent would be so labeled. BISHOP, supra note 84,
at 246–47.
93 See id. at 97; Jelen & Wilcox, supra note 83, at 495. In Canada, for example, pro-life
legislators voted against a measure to recriminalize abortion when the legislation in their view
did not go far enough in outlawing abortion. See ABORTION POLITICS, WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS,
AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF STATE FEMINISM 81 (Dorothy
McBride Stetson ed., 2001).
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uncompromising stance on the status of embryos,94 has been eager to exploit the
images of the hundreds of thousands of frozen cells in fertility clinic freezers.  In
2001, for example, President George W. Bush embraced “embryo adoption,” speaking
about the importance of ensuring that “our society’s most vulnerable members are pro-
tected and defended at every stage of life,”95 and securing federal funds to promote
a movement, the transfer of embryos for reproductive purposes, that it is not clear
anyone wanted for other than ideological reasons.96
At the same time, while some scholars underscore IVF’s association with hetero-
sexual efforts to complete traditional families,97 others emphasize the class and cultural
divide separating IVF users from the rest of the public.98  Poorer women suffer higher
overall rates of impaired fertility.99  Untreated sexually transmitted diseases have a
significant effect on the ability to reproduce, and women without access to routine
medical care suffer from them disproportionately.100  Despite this, better educated,
older and wealthier women are more likely to seek out and use fertility services.101 
In 2002, for example, fifty-four percent of women undergoing fertility treatments were
over the age of thirty-five.102  Another study found that income, insurance coverage,
and parity (number of previous births) all significantly affect the probability of
seeking infertility treatment, though in different ways and to different degrees.103
94 O. Carter Snead, for example, in his retrospective on Bush-era bioethics, comments that
the “most distinctive feature of President Bush’s conception of human equality was its uncon-
ditional and uncontingent nature.” O. Carter Snead, Public Bioethics and the Bush Presidency,
32 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 867, 872 (2009).
95 In doing so, he clearly equated protection of frozen embryos with the anti-abortion cause,
observing that “there is no such thing as a spare embryo. Every embryo is unique and geneti-
cally complete, like every other human being. And each of us started out our life this way.
These lives are not raw material to be exploited, but gifts.” Priests for Life, President Discusses
Embryo Adoption and Ethical Stem Cell Research (May 24, 2005), http://www.priestsforlife
.org/news/05-05-24bushstemcellresearch.htm; see Jaime E. Conde, Embryo Donation: The
Government Adopts a Cause, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273 (2006).
96 See, e.g., Arthur Caplan, The Problem with ‘Embryo Adoption’: Why Is the Govern-
ment Giving Money to ‘Snowflakes?,’ MSNBC, June 24, 2003, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/3076556/ (criticizing award of $1 million in federal funds to agency promoting embryo
donation for reproductive purposes).
97 See discussion of Dolgin and Davis, supra notes 46–64 and accompanying text.
98 See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 22.
99 Seung-Eun Song & Youngtae Cho, Educational Differences in Impaired Fecundity and
the Utilization of Infertility Services 3 (2004), available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/
p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/1/0/2/5/pages110252/p110252-2.php.
100 While infertility is more likely to affect the less educated, more highly educated indi-
viduals are more likely to receive medical services. See id. at 2–3.
101 Id. at 6.
102 VICTORIA CLAY WRIGHT ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREV. & HEALTH
PROMOTION, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SURVEILLANCE—UNITED STATES, 2002,
at 6 (2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss5402a1.htm.
103 J. Farley Ordovensky Staniec & Natalie J. Webb, Utilization of Infertility Services:
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Complicating the matter is the fact that the increased demand for fertility services
is associated with later ages of childbearing—a factor identified with the investment
college-educated women make in their careers.104  The most highly educated women
are the most likely to postpone childbearing.105  Kristin Luker found in the 1980s that
a significant difference between pro-life and pro-choice activists was the age of family
formation; the “average” pro-life activist woman in 1984 was married at seventeen,
had three or more children, had some college education, and was not employed for
pay.  In contrast, the “average” pro-choice activist woman had some graduate educa-
tion, married at twenty-two, had one or two children, and was employed outside the
home.106  Today, similar differences describe the population of states likely to vote
“red” rather than “blue.”  Family characteristics have become a major predictor of
voting patterns, and the politically relevant characteristics include age of marriage,
teen births, overall fertility levels (i.e., the number of children per family), and women’s
employment patterns.107  While we have not found more recent studies that examine
the relationship between age of marriage and pro-choice or pro-life views, the states
that show the greatest support for abortion rights also tend to have higher average ages
of marriage and lower fertility rates.108
Accordingly, the demand for IVF, like the significance of abortion, varies with the
importance of modern versus traditional patterns of family formation, and an embrace
of modern family patterns has occurred more readily in the more liberal and pro-choice
parts of the country.  Nonetheless, support for IVF is widespread—three-quarters of
the American public approves of IVF109—and the fifteen states that have mandated
How Much Does Money Matter?, 42 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 971 (2007), available at http://
www.ncbl.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1955265/pdf/hesr004-0971.pdf.
104 Katherine E. Heck et al., Delayed Childbearing by Education Level in the United States,
1969–1994, 1 MATERNAL AND CHILD. HEALTH J. 81, 86 (1997), available at http://www
.springerlink.com/content/g40p440425n3077/fulltext.pdf.
105 Id.
106 LUKER, supra note 46, at 197.
107 CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 22, at ch. 1.
108 Id.; see also Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, The Power of the Pill: Oral
Contraceptives and Women’s Career and Marriage Decisions, 110 J. POL. ECON. 730, 731
(2002) (examining the correlations between the availability of contraception, abortion and
the age of marriage); Ron Lesthaeghe & Lisa Neidert, Voting and Families: America’s
Second Demographic Transition, NEW GEOGRAPHY, Dec. 11, 2008, available at http://www
.newgeography.com/content/00461-voting-and-families-america%E2%80%99s-second
-demographic-transition (establishing a correlation between family form and voting patterns);
Ron Lesthaeghe & Lisa Neidert, The “Second Demographic Transition” in the U.S.: Exception
or Textbook Example?, Mar. 2006, available at http://sdt.psc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/online/US
_SDT_text.pdf.
109 Davis points out, for example, that “[b]etween 1978 and 1994, public acceptance of IVF
in the United States increased from 60 to 75%,” and suggests that this is true because IVF,
unlike abortion, involves the efforts of traditional heterosexual couples to have children. See
Davis, supra note 21, at 282.
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some form of insurance for fertility services seem to be a random assortment that
include Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas and
West Virginia.110
Embryos are another matter because the passions they inspire, the absolutist
rhetoric associated with them, and their association with political identity have the
potential to drive the future regulation of assisted reproduction.  Moreover, public
discourse and legislative initiatives often proceed from a combination of philosophical
predispositions and prejudices and sensational news coverage.  Examples include
Louise Brown (the first “test tube baby”),111 Melissa Stern (known as “Baby M,” the
child conceived through the use of artificial insemination and the subject of the first
contested surrogacy case),112 and Nadya Suleman (known as “Octomom,” the single
mother of six who used IVF to give birth to octuplets).113  Given the incendiary nature
of anything associated with the moral status of embryos, the definition of the pro-life
movement in absolutist terms, and the existence of a cadre of legislators who have
staked their political careers on identification with abortion politics, it would be re-
markable if the regulation of ART were not influenced by these divisions.
Indeed, culture war politics have already limited oversight of assisted reproduction. 
The controversial nature of the practices has obstructed agreement on financing and
oversight, and the ironic result is that the industry has grown with few of the controls
that shape other parts of medical practice.114  The systematic provision of services—
research, testing, regulation, insurance coverage, and financing—has been caught up
in the same political divisions that hamstring more systematic approaches to contra-
ception and abortion.  Legislative and regulatory oversight of assisted reproduction
has been characterized by moral posturing and regulatory gridlock.
110 Fertility Lifelines, State Mandated Insurance Coverage, http://www.fertilitylifelines
.com/payingfortreatment/state-mandatedinsurancelist.jsp (last visited Apr. 17, 2010). California,
New York, and Louisiana, however, exclude all or part of the costs associated with IVF.
111 See Medicine: Test-Tube Baby: It’s a Girl, TIME, Aug. 7, 1978, available at http://www
.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,948239,00.html.
112 See Roger Rosenblatt, Baby M.—Emotions for Sale, TIME, Apr. 6, 1987, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,963927,00.html.
113 Nadya Suleman: Octuplets’ Mom “Didn’t Want to Get Married,” Had IVF for 14 Kids,
ASSOC. PRESS, Jan. 31, 2009, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/31/nadya
-suleman-octuplets-m_n_162756.html.
114 Business school professor Debora Spar describes our existing regulatory regime as
follows: “In the United States, however, regulatory and legislative authorities have largely
ignored the market for reproductive services. There are very few restrictions on fertility treat-
ments and little regulation of providers. Instead, the market for fertility in the United States
is vibrant, competitive, and expanding in the absence of any kind of formal controls. Because
the United States is such a large and technically advanced market, moreover, it serves as a
magnet for infertile couples around the world.” DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW
MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 5 (2006).
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Comprehensive approaches have stalled in part because of religious opposition. 
The Catholic Church has opposed in vitro fertilization altogether, objecting that the
practices emphasizing “the human dignity proper to the embryo,” and “the right of
every person to be conceived and to be born within marriage and from marriage.”115 
Mainstream Protestants (including the Episcopal Church, the Presbyterian Church,
USA, the United Methodist Church, and the United Church of Christ), Jews and
Muslims have largely supported IVF, but more fundamentalist Protestants, including
the Southern Baptist Convention, recognize embryos as human lives and object to
excess embryos being discarded, frozen, or used for research purposes.116  Leon Kass,
the Chairman of President George W. Bush’s Council on Bioethics, denounced repro-
ductive and genetic research in 1972 as heralding “a new holy war against human
nature.”117
The result was blocked research funding at the federal level until President Obama
took office.  Not only did social conservative groups oppose funding for embryonic
stem cell research that would destroy embryos in the process of creating a stem cell
line, these groups thwarted funding for embryo research that might enhance fertility.118 
The efforts started in the seventies almost immediately after Roe v. Wade legalized
115 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Respect for Human Life in
its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation: Replies to Certain Questions of the Day, avail-
able at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith
_doc_19870222_respect-for-human-life_en.html. The instruction states, “[i]n homologous
IVF and ET . . . therefore, even if it is considered in the context of ‘de facto’ existing sexual
relations, the generation of the human person is objectively deprived of its proper perfection:
namely, that if being the result and fruit of a conjugal act in which the spouses can become
‘cooperators with God for giving life to a new person.’ These reasons enable us to understand
why the act of conjugal love is considered in the teaching of the Church as the only setting
worthy of human protection.” Id.  The instruction also objects to freezing embryos: “[t]he
freezing of embryos, even when carried out in order to preserve the life of an embryo cryo-
preservation constitutes an offence against the respect due to human beings by exposing
them to grave risks of death or harm to their physical integrity and depriving them, at least
temporarily, of maternal shelter and gestation, thus placing them in a situation in which further
offences and manipulation are possible.” Id.
116 KATE M. OTT, RELIGIOUS INSTITUTE, A TIME TO BE BORN: A FAITH-BASED GUIDE TO
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 19 (2009), available at http://www.religiousinstitute
.org/sites/default/files/study_guides/atimetobeborn.pdf. Nonetheless, social conservative groups
have not acted to oppose IVF entirely. See, e.g., Robin Toner, The Vatican’s Doctrine: Political
Impact; Contrast to Abortion Issue is Discerned, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1987, at B10 (contrast-
ing the absence of a “powerful consensus” among Catholics, fundamentalist and evangelical
Christians about surrogacy and test-tube fertilization with those groups’ opposition to abortion).
117 ROBIN MARANTZ HENIG, PANDORA’S BABY: HOW THE FIRST TEST TUBE BABIES
SPARKED THE REPRODUCTIVE REVOLUTION 70 (2004) (quoting Leon Kass, New Beginnings
in Life, in THE NEW GENETICS AND THE FUTURE OF MAN 20–21 (Michael P. Hamilton ed.,
1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
118 Id. at 258–60.
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abortion and culminated in the “Dickey Amendment,” which has been attached to
every Health and Human Services appropriations bill since 1996.119  The amendment
forbids federal funding for “research in which a human embryo or embryos are de-
stroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death.”120  Since much
of the federal regulation of medicine involves controls on research spending, and since
embryo research addresses the techniques most likely to further assisted reproduction,
reproductive research has taken place largely free from public oversight, approval,
or guidance.121
In addition, health insurance plans, which tend to favor more qualified doctors and
more tested procedures, and which may insist on greater transparency and account-
ability,122 rarely cover assisted reproduction.123  A small number of states mandate
health insurance coverage for assisted reproduction in plans that otherwise cover re-
productive services, but the courts have found that federal pension legislation preempts
state law, limiting state mandates to smaller plans.124  The combination of limited
insurance coverage with the lack of European-style public subsidization effectively
limits access to assisted reproduction to wealthier and more sophisticated patients,
which in turn alleviates what might otherwise be greater pressure for regulation.125
119 Philip J. Nickel, Ethical Issues in Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, in FUNDA-
MENTALS OF THE STEM CELL DEBATE: THE SCIENTIFIC, RELIGIOUS, ETHICAL, AND POLITICAL
ISSUES 62, 74 (Monroe et al. eds., 2008).
120 Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 128, 104th Cong., 110 Stat.
26, 128 (1996). The 2005 version of the amendment provided that “None of the funds made
available in this Act may be used for . . . research in which a human embryo or embryos are
destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death greater than that allowed
for research on fetuses in utero under 45 CFR 46.208(a)(2) and 42 U.S.C. 289g(b).” Dep’t of
Health and Human Serv. Appropriations Act 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-149, § 509, 109th Cong.,
119 Stat. 2833, 2280 (2005).
121 Note, Guiding Regulatory Reform in Reproduction and Genetics, 120 HARV. L. REV.
574, 579 (2006). IVF clinics had little difficulty attracting private research funds, and in this
context, “caution was not a foremost concern, and few external forces existed to slow the
work of the clinic.” Id. at 587.
122 Robert J. Levine, Federal Funding and the Regulation of Embryonic Stem Cell Research:
The Pontius Pilate Maneuver, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 552, 561–62 (2009)
(“Because insurance coverage for ART is quite limited, reimbursement requirements fail to
promote quality care.”).
123 John A. Robertson, Commerce and Regulation in the Assisted Reproduction Industry,
85 TEX. L. REV. 665, 674 (2007) (reviewing DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW
MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION (2006)); see JESSICA
ARONS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, FUTURE CHOICES: ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
AND THE LAW 8–11 (2007), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/12/
pdf/future_choices_section1.pdf. California requires insurance coverage of most treatments
for infertility but excludes IVF procedures. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 1374.55
(West 2000); CAL. INS. CODE ANN. § 10119.6 (West 1993).
124 See ARONS, supra note 123, at 9.
125 See Levine, supra note 122, at 562.
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The ironic result of these forces has been the development of an industry of
willing patients and providers, selecting procedures in the context of small scale
private clinics.126
Within this deregulatory environment, the only significant piece of federal leg-
islation to date has been a reporting requirement; the United States Fertility Clinic
Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 requires fertility clinics to report success
rates, albeit with no punitive sanctions for failure to disclose.127  Fertility clinics are
also required to comply with human tissue testing regulations concerning the safety
of donor gametes, which largely limits the participation of gay men as donors.128
These developments have consequences for the shape of the industry.  First, the
lack of regulation has meant that fertility clinics can easily arrange for the delivery
of services that cross state, and sometimes international, lines.  Through internet
advertising and the development of affiliations, they can take advantage of a larger
market, with the ability to refer prospective patients to friendlier legal jurisdictions
if necessary.129  Growing Generations, for example, began in California as a surrogacy
agency with services focused on the gay community; it now is affiliated with a sperm
bank and a law center, provides consultations in Australia and Britain, and offers to
meet with anyone, anywhere, through Skype.130
A controversial surrogacy case illustrates how such interstate transactions work. 
A commissioning parent in Ohio (the 62-year-old chairman of the Math Department
at Cleveland State) secured the services of a Ohio clinic, which arranged for a gesta-
tional surrogate in Pennsylvania, and an egg donor from Texas.131  The subsequent
litigation over custody of the resulting triplets created new law in Pennsylvania, which
had neither statutory nor case law addressing the matter, and a companion case about
payment in Ohio.132  Had the commissioning parent been unable to find a suitable
126 The Harvard Law Review suggests that “the initially stronger connection between
abortion and reproductive services—due to the use of embryos in IVF research—may have
created an early regulatory deadlock that unexpectedly accelerated the development and broad
availability of IVF. The strong public acceptance of IVF that ensued, coupled with an en-
trenched economic force in the form of a private fertility industry, may have then solidified
the early deadlock into a long-term deregulatory norm that has persisted to this day.” Guiding
Regulatory Reform, supra note 121, at 584.
127 The United States Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 263a-1 through 263a-7 (1994).
128 See, e.g., CAHN, supra note 5, at 56–59.
129 See, e.g., Thailand Offers Less Expensive Fertility Treatment, Preimplantation Genetic
Diagnosis, Attracting “Fertility Tourists,” MEDICAL NEWS TODAY, Aug. 10, 2006, available
at http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/49176.php.
130 Growing Generations Home Page, http://www.growinggenerations.com (last visited
Jan. 30, 2010).
131 Surrogate Mom, Biological Dad Battle Over Triplets, ASSOC. PRESS, May 1, 2005, avail-
able at http://www.sptimes.com/2005/05/01/Worldandnation/Surrogate_mom__biolog.shtml.
132 J.F. v. D.B., 897 A.2d 1261 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006); J.F. v. D.B., 848 N.E.2d 873 (Ohio
App. 9 Dist. 2006).
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clinic in Cleveland, it would have been a relatively easy matter for him to secure one
elsewhere.
Second, with private financing critical to fertility clinics and federally mandated
reporting of success rates important to patient choice, the desire to improve success
rates often drives accepted practices.  This has meant, for example, that American
clinics have been slower than European clinics to reduce the number of embryos
implanted.133
Third, with small scale clinics, private financing, and little public oversight, the
discussion of appropriate practices has also been limited.  The American Society for
Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) has promulgated ethical guidelines, but these volun-
tary professional guidelines do not receive the same attention or enforcement as public
oversight.134  Texas Professor John Robertson observed the existence of “the moral
dilemma that the need for legal infrastructure presents to those loathe to accept ART
in the first place.  Creating infrastructure signals approval, legitimizes the practice,
and encourages expansion by reducing the planning costs of those engaging in it.”135 
While the absence of regulation has not been a barrier to “full-throated development
of the field,”136 it has meant that development of ethical understandings of the prac-
tices has been reserved for the participants—to the extent it has occurred at all.
All of these factors, however, have begun to change.  Over the last two decades,
more states have mandated insurance funding137 and the number of couples undergoing
fertility treatments has risen.  Some new procedures, such as preimplantation genetic
diagnosis, which allows testing for genetic traits and defects before implantation of
an embryo in a woman’s womb, have sparked new controversies and calls for regu-
lation.138  In other cases, medical researchers question the wisdom of older techniques,
particularly those that lead to risky multiple births.139
Moreover, the increase in the number of patients has in itself increased the visi-
bility of the practices, and awareness of fertility clinic abuses.  Embryo mix-ups, for
example, in which an embryo has been accidentally implanted in the wrong woman
133 See Stephanie Nano, Most Fertility Clinics Break the Rules, Feb. 23, 2009, available
at http://www.komonews.com/news/health/40089337.html. It also encourages the production
of extra embryos because the extraction of multiple eggs from the woman’s body makes
subsequent efforts less intrusive and expensive and because doctors have had more success
freezing embryos than unfertilized eggs.
134 American Society of Reproductive Medicine, Practice Comm. Reports, http://www
.asrm.org/Media/Practice/practice.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
135 Robertson, supra note 123, at 684.
136 Id. at 685.
137 Infertility Coverage in Your State, RESOLVE: The National Infertility Association, http://
www.resolve.org/site/PageServer?pagename=lrn_ic_stintro (last visited Apr. 17, 2010) (noting
fifteen states have laws requiring insurance coverage for infertility treatment).
138 See Goodwin, supra note 37, at 1710, 1726 & n.343.
139 See, e.g., id. at 1658–59.
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have caused heart-rending, and often publicly riveting, dilemmas.140  And everything
about the solicitation of gamete donors, from the Ivy League ads seeking women with
high SAT scores, to the ubiquitous Craigslist postings seeking Asian eggs, to the
enterprising children tracing their supposed anonymous progenitors, has generated
public discussion and calls for oversight.141
Yet, the calls for oversight set the stage for a battle over the terms of engagement. 
Some oppose the very idea of IVF as an affront to the role of reproduction within
marriage and to the natural order and the dignity of the resulting child.142  Other
groups see assisted reproduction as a way to circumvent the historic limitations on
non-marital reproduction, and to create a variety of families of choice.143  Even among
those who favor assisted reproduction, no agreement exists on its symbols or signifi-
cance.  These disputes set the stage for the emergence of embryo fundamentalism as
a significant force not only in the national debate over ART, but in the creation of the
networks that will determine the future development of the industry.  The determination
of the largely unformed terms of these new practices seems destined to take place
on a battlefield defined by the most extreme and irreconcilable of societal views.
IV. EMBRYO FUNDAMENTALISM AND LEGISLATIVE ACTIVISM
The current round of embryo activism has been generated by the 2009 publicity
surrounding Nadya Suleman’s octuplets, although a few states had already enacted
legislation regulating the status of embryos.144  The controversial births prompted
legislative proposals that have brought together moral absolutism on the status of
embryos, increased calls for regulatory oversight from the left and the right, and
helped the development of a movement to encourage embryo transfers for reproduc-
tive purposes.145  These proposals linked right-to-life/anti-abortion activists even more
directly with reproductive technology issues.
Suleman, already a single mother of six, had six remaining embryos left over from
earlier IVF efforts when she and her doctor decided to implant all of them in what they
expected would be a last effort to produce additional children.146  Although she was
140 See, e.g., Embryo Mix-Up at Fertility Clinic Resolved Amicably, NEW HAVEN
REGISTER, Sept. 24, 2009, available at http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2009/09/24/news/
d3-embryo3rd.txt.
141 CAHN, supra note 5, at 145–64.
142 See id. at 167.
143 See id.
144 See National Conference of State Legislatures, Embryo and Gamete Disposition Laws,
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14379 (last visited Apr. 17, 2010) (detailing which
states had laws regarding embryos in 2007).
145 See Lawsky & Cahn, supra note 18.
146 Nadya Suleman’s Fertility Doctor Under Scrutiny, NBC, Feb. 7, 2009, http://www
.nbclosangeles.com/news/local-beat/Nadya-Sulemans-Fertility-Doctor-Under-Scrutiny.html.
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relatively young (33), the doctor had implanted six embryos in each of her prior preg-
nancies, resulting in two sets of twins and two singleton births.147  Neither she nor her
doctor believed that all six would develop, much less that two of the embryos would
split, producing octuplets.148  Implanting six embryos, however, violated ASRM guide-
lines, and the California Medical Board investigated the doctor’s practices to determine
if there was “a violation of the standard of care.”149  Moreover, Suleman, as a divorced
mother on disability living with her parents, touched off denunciations in many circles
by her use of IVF to have fourteen children.150  To many on all sides of the ART issue,
she stands as a dramatic symbol of the unregulated nature of the industry.
The legislative moral panic and proposals that have followed, however, reflect
pre-existing ideological positions more than pragmatic responses to the Suleman
case.  No legislature, for example, has adopted limits on the number of embryos to
be implanted in spite of widespread agreement that the doctor’s actions in implant-
ing six embryos in a young woman of proven fertility were inappropriate.151  Instead,
the proposals have used the Suleman controversy to stake out fundamentalist
approaches to IVF.  This section uses Louisiana’s approach, developed before the
Suleman moral panic, as an early role model,152 and then considers how other states
have approached the legal status of embryos.
A. Louisiana
Louisiana became the first state to address the status of IVF embryos, adopting
comprehensive legislation in 1986.153  At the time the Louisiana legislature enacted 
the measures, the Reagan coalition had emerged nationally.  Louisiana, however,
has long combined conservative Southern politics with an influential Catholic
constituency, and the Louisiana legislation reflected state forces.
The bill originated with John Krentel’s 1983 article in the Louisiana Bar Journal
in 1985, which he wrote while he was still at Loyola Law School.154  He published the
article three years after the birth of the first IVF baby in the United States, and did
so as IVF clinics were still getting off the ground in Louisiana.155  The first baby was
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 See Cahn & Collins, supra note 1 (providing an analysis of the response to Nadya
Suleman).
151 Id. at 503.
152 See infra notes 165–74.
153 See John B. Krentel, The Louisiana “Human Embryo” Statute Revisited: Reasonable
Recognition and Protection for the In Vitro Fertilized Ovum: Reproductive Technology and
the In Vitro Fertilized Ovum, 45 LOY. L. REV. 239 (1999).
154 John B. Krentel, “Ownership” of the Fertilized Ovum In Vitro: A Hypothetical Case
in Louisiana, 32 LA. B. J. 284 (1985).
155 For Krentel’s retrospective on the act, see Krentel, supra note 153.
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born in the United States from a frozen embryo only after the article was published;156
Krentel reported that Louisiana practice at the time was to implant all embryos cre-
ated.157  Krentel noted that the nascent industry lobbied for the legislation, and that
“the medical specialists specifically requested that the legislature define the required
medical qualifications for the practice of reproductive medicine with regard to the
fertilization, implantation, and storage of fertilized embryos.”158
Nonetheless, the statute’s principal innovation was its attempt to define embryos
as human life, and to construct a legal infrastructure for their disposition consistent
with that definition.  Krentel reasoned that “a state has the sovereign power to create
juridical identities,”159 a term previously used to describe corporations,160 and that
it represented a middle ground acknowledging the humanity of the embryo, but stop-
ping short of granting it the full personhood of a “natural” person.161  Krentel, how-
ever, insisted on recognition of “the essential equality of all human beings.”162  He
observed, “[w]hile the Supreme Court may be incapable of embracing this funda-
mental premise, nonetheless those health care providers involved in in vitro fertili-
zation services ought to strongly consider this maxim,”163 and the new statute sought
to compel them to do so.
The statute directly addressed embryo status, providing that, “An in vitro fertilized
human ovum exists as a juridical person until such time as the in vitro fertilized ovum
is implanted in the womb; or at any other time when rights attach to an unborn child
in accordance with law.”164  By limiting the statute’s reach to the period between fertili-
zation and implantation, the statute avoided conflict with a woman’s bodily integrity
and the Supreme Court decisions recognizing a woman’s right to terminate an embryo
during the early stages of pregnancy.  The statute emphasized further that “[th]e use
of a human ovum fertilized in vitro is solely for the support and contribution of the
156 See Giovanna Breu & Frank Feldinger, In California, a Small Bundle of Medical
History Arrives on Time: The First U.S. Frozen Embryo Baby, Archive, PEOPLE, June 23,
1986, available at http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20093925,00.html.
157 Krentel, supra note 154, at 287.
158 Krentel, supra note 153, at 240.
159 Krentel, supra note 154, at 287.
160 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 479 (1983).
161 Krentel, supra note 153, at 242–43. Krentel observes, “Because of the potential for
development into a full human person, the Louisiana legislature determined that this entity is
deserving of special consideration, respect, and legal recognition as a juridical person. Further-
more, the legislature also impliedly found that the fertilized ovum is not yet ready for full recog-
nition as a natural person. In Louisiana, the rights and privileges appertaining to a natural
person do not flow to the in vitro fertilized ovum, but certain rights are ascribed to this unique
extra-corporeal biological being: the right to life, the right to protection from harm, the right
to counsel, and the right to be adopted.” Id. (citations omitted).
162 Krentel, supra note 154, at 287.
163 Id.
164 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:123 (2009).
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complete development of human in utero implantation.”165  Sale or creation for other
purposes is expressly prohibited.166
The statute thus precluded the creation of embryos for stem cell or other research
even though stem cell research was not on the horizon in the mid-eighties.  The statute
rejected the idea that an embryo could be regarded as property or could be destroyed.167 
Instead, it took pains to recognize the cells as children with “parents.”168  The statute
states that if the progenitors express their identity, “then their rights as parents as pro-
vided under the Louisiana Civil Code will be preserved.”169  If not, the physician
would become a “temporary guardian” until “adoptive implantation can occur.”170 
The court also has the power to appoint a curator to protect the embryo’s rights.  These
provisions, while treating the embryo as similar to a child, stop short of requiring
progenitors to implant them.  The statute nonetheless specifies that the embryos are
owed a “high duty of care”171 and that if the patients renounce their parental rights
“by notarial act,”172
then the in vitro fertilized human ovum shall be available for
adoptive implantation . . . .  The in vitro fertilization patients
may renounce their parental rights in favor of another married
couple, but only if the other couple is willing and able to receive
the in vitro fertilized ovum. . . .  Constructive fulfillment of the
statutory provisions for adoption in this state shall occur when a
married couple executes a notarial act of adoption of the in vitro
fertilized ovum and birth occurs.173
This section provided for embryo donation for reproductive purposes well before the
idea took hold elsewhere.174  It facilitates embryo transfer by providing for the pre-
birth termination of the progenitors’ parental rights, and establishing the donees’
parental status without formal adoption procedures such as a home study.175  It accord-
ingly resolves doubts about the resulting child’s identity and parentage.  Moreover,
165 Id. § 9:122.
166 Id. § 9:124.
167 Id. § 9:126.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. § 9:130.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 “[O]ne IVF-cryopreservation clinic in the state donates all spare embryos but has con-
fronted a dilemma in that, at least in the first few months of operation, more couples want
to donate than receive spare embryos.” ANDREA L. BONNICKSEN, IN VITRO FERTILIZATION:
BUILDING POLICY FROM LABORATORIES TO LEGISLATURES 96 (1989).
175 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:130 (2009).
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the statute directed that any dispute would be resolved in accordance with “the best
interest of the in vitro fertilized ovum.”176  This section appears to provide for implan-
tation of the embryo in the event of a dispute between progenitors who divorce, in
light of its articulation of a “best interest” standard.  The result would directly con-
tradict the decisions in other states, but no cases appear to have arisen to date.177  The
statute does not address the validity of contracts providing for the disposition of frozen
embryos, but its use of a best interest standard to resolve disputes suggests that third
parties cannot contract around the statutory provisions any more than parents can use
contracts adversely to a child’s interests.178
The constitutionality of the Louisiana statute has never been tested, although it
has certainly been subject to critique.179  It stops short of requiring that the progenitors
implant all of the embryos they create or make them available for adoption.  While it
precludes destruction, it would not appear to prevent the indefinite storage of frozen
embryos180 or to bar transfer out of state.181  So long as they remain in Louisiana,
however, embryos merit the protection of the state.  Indeed, during the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, the governor of Louisiana personally oversaw rescue efforts of
frozen embryos in the freezers of New Orleans hospitals.182
B. Georgia
If the Louisiana legislation dates back to the beginning of IVF in the United
States, the Georgia legislation is a direct response to the publicity surrounding Nadya
Suleman’s octuplets.183  Rep. James Mills, a longstanding abortion foe, introduced the
“Option of Adoption Act” as part of a set of bills that constituted an anti-abortion
176 Id. § 9:131.
177 See supra notes 38–44 and accompanying text.
178 Louisiana law also limits the liability of the clinics involved in the transfer of embryos
to “the human uterus” and deals with inheritance rights. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:132–133.
179 See, e.g., Sarah A. Weber, Comment, Dismantling the Dictated Moral Code: Modifying
Louisiana’s In Vitro Fertilization Statutes to Protect Patients’ Procreative Liberty, 51 LOY.
L. REV. 549 (2005).
180 The Fertility Institute in New Orleans already has seven thousand preembryos in storage,
including ones that have been there since the late 1980s. Glaser, supra note 10.
181 See, e.g., York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989) (holding that parents could
use replevin to recover embryos in Virginia that they wanted to transfer to a different clinic
in California). A Louisiana court could conceivably find, however, that the best interests of the
embryo preclude transfer if the parents still live in Louisiana and wish to transfer them out of
state to destroy them or to evade the protections of Louisiana law and the statute arguably
grants the court jurisdiction to appoint a conservator even in cases in which the progenitors
are asserting parental rights. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:126.
182 MICHELLE WARD GHETTI, AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, LIFE AND THE LOUISIANA
SUPREME COURT: A DRAMATIC RESCUE TELLS IT ALL 1 (2007), http://www.aul.org/xm_client/
client_documents/sscp?LA.pdf.
183 Cahn & Collins, supra note 1, at 503.
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response to Suleman.184  These bills had a variety of objectives: adopting language that
systematically recognizes embryos as human life from the moment of conception,
facilitating embryo transfer for reproductive purposes, limiting stem cell research in
the state, and more closely regulating IVF.185  The resulting legislation, however, jetti-
soned the provisions that would have had the greatest impact on the well-established
Georgia fertility industry and focused on the procedures necessary to facilitate embryo
donation for reproductive purposes.
The rhetoric in the initial bills crafted a right-to-life approach.  The proposed
“Ethical Treatment of Human Embryos Act” would have amended the chapter of the
Georgia Code relating to the parent-child relationship to define an embryo as a “bio-
logical human being who is not the property of any person or entity.”186  Similarly,
the initial version of the “Option of Adoption Act” would have amended the definition
of “child” for purposes of the Georgia adoption statute, so that “child” meant not only
“a person who is under 18 years of age and who is sought to be adopted,” but also
“a human embryo.”187
The proposed legislation received strong support from Georgia Right to Life,
an anti-abortion group, viewing them as part of an effort to “establish personhood
for the pre-born.”188
The final version of the Option of Adoption Act did not, however, redefine
“child” to include human embryos.  Instead, the legislation amends the Georgia Code
to add a new article that allows the progenitors to “relinquish all rights and responsi-
bilities for an embryo to a recipient intended parent” before transfer of the embryo.189 
The act states that:
A child born to a recipient intended parent as the result of embryo
relinquishment pursuant to subsection (a) of this Code section
shall be presumed to be the legal child of the recipient intended
parent; provided that each legal embryo custodian and each recip-
ient intended parent has entered into a written contract.190
184 See H.B. 388, 150th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009).
185 See S.B. 169, 150th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009) (as introduced); H.B. 388,
150th Gen Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009) (as introduced).
186 S.B. 169, 150th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009). A version of this bill that did not
define an embryo as a human being was passed by the Senate and as of January 15, 2010 has
yet to be voted on by the House. For further discussion of the legislation, see generally Lawsky
& Cahn, supra note 18.
187 H.B. 388, 150th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009) (as introduced).
188 Audrey Barrick, Ga. House Passes Nation’s First Embryo Adoption Bill, CHRISTIAN
POST, Apr. 4, 2009, available at http://www.christianpost.com/Society/Ethics_rights/2009/
04/ga-house-passes-nation-s-first-embryo-adoption-bill-04/index.html (quoting Daniel Becker,
President, Georgia Right to Life).
189 H.B. 388, 150th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009) (as introduced).
190 GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-41(d) (2009).
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This provision offers a modern twist on the marital presumption in traditional family
law by creating a presumption that the birth mother and her husband are parents with-
out further legal action.  Another provision, however, authorizes the intended parents
to petition the courts before or after the child’s birth for an expedited order of “adoption
or parentage.”191  The court order, which can be issued by a court with jurisdiction
over adoption, provides greater protection for prospective parents and greater likeli-
hood of interstate recognition should parentage be contested in another jurisdiction.192 
Unlike the legal procedures applicable to adoption, the statute effectively authorizes
a transfer of parental rights before birth and without the home study that would be
ordinarily required in an adoption.
Georgia also considered legislation last spring (2009) that would have established
(a) limits on the number of eggs that could be fertilized; (b) limits on the number of
embryos that a doctor could transfer; (c) a ban on freezing embryos, and (d) a ban
on payment for donor egg, sperm and embryo.193  RESOLVE, the national infertility
advocacy group, was able to help generate almost 100,000 contacts to the state legis-
lature to prevent enactment of the legislation.194  The Georgia fertility industry success-
fully argued that such restrictions would simply drive fertility patients out-of-state.195 
The legislation that passed in Georgia, by contrast, staked out a more fundamentalist
position on the status of embryos without directly affecting fertility clinic practice
in the state; the only legislation to take effect facilitated embryo transfers without the
inflammatory rhetoric that dominated press coverage.196  Even then, its sponsors en-
couraged the headlines celebrating the act as the “nation’s first embryo adoption bill”
despite the fact that legislation existed in states as varied as California, Louisiana,
Oklahoma and Florida authorizing the practice.197
C. Other Approaches to Embryo Transfers: From Oklahoma to California
Oklahoma has also passed legislation facilitating embryo transfers for reproduc-
tive purposes.198  The legislation treats the resulting child as the child of the “husband
191 Id. § 19-8-42(a).
192 See June Carbone, The Role of Adoption in Winning Public Recognition for Adult
Partnerships, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 341, 393–94 (2006).
193 S.B. 169, 150th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009) (as introduced).
194 Press Release, supra note 19.
195 See, e.g., Georgia “Octomom Bill” Would Limit Embryo Implants, CNN, Mar. 3, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/03/03/georgia.octomom.bill/index.html (“Patients seeking re-
productive care in Georgia will go to Tennessee or South Carolina or Alabama. They will
just leave.”).
196 Ewa Kochanska, The Nation’s First Embryo Adoption Bill Passed Georgia Senate,
EXAMINER, http://www.examiner.com/x-6571-Atlanta-Political-Buzz-Examiner~y2009m4d1
-The-nations-first-embryo-adoption-bill-passed-Georgia-Senate (last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
197 See id.; see also infra Section C.
198 OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 556 (2009).
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and wife desiring to receive” so long as the donor husband and wife and the recipients
sign written agreements to that effect.199  The statute requires the physician performing
the procedure to file the written consents with the court, and the recipients’ consent
must be “executed and acknowledged” by “any judge of a court having adoption juris-
diction in this state.”200  The legislation further provides that an embryo transfer is not
“trafficking in children” so long as there is no sale involved.201
In 2009, Tennessee considered legislation that would have provided the pro-
tections of a formal adoption to those who used donated embryos, although it did not
require formal court approval in order for the embryo exchange to proceed.202  Some
of the entities that strongly supported the Tennessee legislation were the Tennessee
Eagle Forum203 and FACT,204 which defines its mission as a belief that “healthy
families and communities come about when basic values from the Bible are embraced
and upheld.  Neglecting commonsense biblical values contributes to many of our
nation’s current ills like crime, disease, divorce, ‘unwanted’ pregnancies, teen suicide
and academic failure.”205
In other states, there have been movements to support “personhood” initiatives
that accord personhood status to embryos.206  A Nevada judge in early 2010 struck
down an attempt to bring such an initiative to a vote.207  As attorneys opposing the
initiative explained, it would have had implications for reproductive technology as
well as abortion.208
A number of states, however, have provisions that facilitate embryo transfer as
part of a comprehensive approach to assisted reproduction.  California, for example,
in creating a legal infrastructure designed to encourage stem cell research passed leg-
islation in 2002 requiring fertility clinics to provide patients with a complete list of
embryo disposition options.209  These options include destruction and donation for
199 Id.
200 Id. § 556(A).
201 Id. § 556(E).
202 S.B. 2136, 150th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2009); Emily Bregel, Georgia:
Clarifying Terms of Adoption, TIMES FREE PRESS, Apr. 27. 2009, http://northgeorgia.times
freepress.com/news/2009/apr/27/georgia-clarifying-terms-adoption/?print.
203 Tennessee Eagle Forum, Legislative Action Alert, http://www.tneagleforum.org/custpage
.cfm/frm/36598/sec_id/36598 (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
204 Family Action Council of Tennessee, What is Fact?, http://www.factn.org/organization
.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
205 Id.
206 See Kathleen Gilbert, Nevada Launches Personhood Initiative, Oct. 22, 2009, available
at http://www.lifesitenews.com/ldn/2009/oct/09102202.html.
207 See Nevada Judge Throws Out “Personhood” Initiative, NPR, Jan. 10, 2010, available
at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122377040&ft=1&f=1001.
208 Sandra Chereb, Judge Throws out Nevada “Personhood” Initiative, SILICON VALLEY
MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 8, 2010, available at http://www.mercurynews.com/news/ci_14148345.
209 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125315 (2009).
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research or reproductive purposes.210  The Texas Uniform Parentage Act provides for
embryo donation as part of its regulation of parenthood in the context of a variety of
techniques.211  The Act requires a married women and her husband to consent in writ-
ing to establish parenthood,212 and recognizes the woman who gives birth as the legal
mother unless there has been a legal proceeding recognizing someone else.213  The
Florida Parentage Act similarly terminates the parental status of the donors214 and pro-
vides that, with the exception of gestational surrogacy, “any child born within wedlock
who has been conceived by means of donated eggs or preembryos shall be irrebuttably
presumed to be the child of the recipient gestating woman and her husband, provided
that both parties have consented in writing to the use of donated eggs or preembryos.”215
The California, Florida and Texas statutes, which were passed in the context of
systematic oversight of ART, address embryo donation without all of the political
posturing of embryo fundamentalists to the legal status of embryos.  To be sure, the
Florida and Texas provisions limit the process to husbands and wives,216 but in none
of these states was the support for embryo donation to infertile couples particularly
controversial.217  Indeed, even in Louisiana, the industry did not oppose the legislation
that defined embryos as “juridical persons” because the statute effectively provided
legislative sanction for the potentially controversial practice of IVF at an early stage
in its development.218
The relatively recent Georgia statute, in contrast, could be hailed as the nation’s
first “embryo adoption” law precisely because it eschewed the language of donation
for adoption.  Although as a practical matter, the statute operates in similar legal terms
to parentage statutes elsewhere, the right to life press hailed use of the term “legal
embryo custodian” to replaces “embryo donor” throughout Georgia’s new code as
though it were a critical innovation.219  Whatever happens to assisted reproduction
in practice, the war of words is likely to continue.
210 Id.
211 See generally TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160 (Vernon 2009).
212 Id. § 160.704(a).
213 Id. § 160.201(a). The statute also terminates the parental status of donors. Id. § 160.702.
214 FLA. STAT. § 742.14 (2009).
215 Id. § 742.11.
216 So, too, do the Louisiana and Oklahoma statutes. This presents significant practical and
symbolic political issues.
217 See FLA. STAT. § 742.11 (legislating the status of children born via donated embryos
“within wedlock”); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160 (limiting consent to a “married woman” and
“her husband”).
218 See Susan L. Crockin, The “Embryo” Wars: At the Epicenter of Science, Law, Religion,
and Politics, 39 FAM. L.Q. 599, 610 (2005) (noting that the Louisiana statute imbues the embryo
with personhood and stating that the IVF patients and fertility clinics may not destroy the
embryos, but instead “may be deemed a ‘temporary guardian,’ until ‘adoptive implantation’
by ‘another married couple’ can occur”).
219 Georgia Passes Nation’s First Embryo Adoption Law, CHRISTIAN NEWSWIRE, Apr. 3,
2009, available at http://www.christiannewswire.com/news/630359951.html.
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V. EMBRYO FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE POLITICS OF PURITY
Janet Dolgin identified the critical development in the right-to-life movement of
the last two decades as its shift from a movement in rebellion against the changing
status of women to one focused on fetal and embryonic status.220  This shift occurred
as a part of a more general political realignment that has given greater voice to the
most authoritarian, hierarchical and uncompromising voices in the American political
spectrum, and as the Republican party considers an ideological purity test as a basis
for party support.221  Abortion politics has gained appeal in this context precisely
because of its claim to moral clarity and its resistance to compromise.
The move to greater insistence on ideological purity, however, also gives rise to
a dilemma.  While fealty to the pro-life cause has locked in a conservative base of sup-
port, extension of the same principles more generally—to stem cell research, embryo
freezing, IVF—risks alienating a significant part of the electorate.222  The result has
been a preference for rhetoric over action.  Introducing pro-life bills designed to fail,
holding efforts to ban reproductive cloning (which relatively few want) hostage to
efforts to prohibit therapeutic cloning (which the majority supports), defining embryos
as “juridical persons” without interfering with fertility practices allows the voices
of purity to rally the base without producing the type of backlash that marginalizes
the cause.
The result has produced legislative gridlock over the regulation of assisted re-
production.  Pragmatic oversight, such as the California legislation authorizing embryo
donation,223 risks granting official approval to controversial practices, and such leg-
islation has been relatively rare.224  At the same time, the fertility industry has flour-
ished and has had enough clout to block Georgia’s efforts to grant too much standing
to embryos or to limit ethically questionable practices such as the implantation of
multiple embryos in an apparently fertile thirty-three-year old.225
As the industry has matured, however, the calls for legal reform grow louder. 
Some center on greater oversight of industry practices.226  The most basic address the
issues of parentage.  Embryo donation, like gamete donation before it, is risky without
certainty about parental status.  Prospective adoptive parents have been traumatized
220 Dolgin, supra note 47, at 132–34.
221 See, e.g., Republicans Considering Ideological Purity Test for Candidates, YAHOO!,
Nov. 24, 2009, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ynews/ynews_pl996; supra nn. 68–80.
222 See, e.g., Dolgin, supra note 47, at 154–60.
223 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125315 (2009).
224 For an overview of the legislation states have enacted surrounding embryo disposition,
see NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, EMBRYO AND GAMETE DISPOSITION
LAWS, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14379 (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
225 See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 19 (“Facing a groundswell of opposition from
patients, doctors, and lawyers, the legislators first gutted, and then passed a much watered-
down version of the original bill, Senate Bill (SB) 169.”).
226 See generally CAHN, supra note 5.
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by the fear that birth parents will change their mind before an adoption is complete.227 
Carrying a child to term only to enter into a fight over the child’s future would be heart
rending.  Just as legislative sanction has encouraged the growth of egg and sperm
donation, so, too, does embryo donation benefit from a legal infrastructure authorizing
the practice and providing certainty about the resulting parental status.  And there
seems to be relatively little opposition to the practice so long as it arises between
consenting donors and recipients.
The issue instead is one of ideological purity: will embryo donations become
simply one more arena for the construction of the meaning of reproduction, and will
it be done on terms that advance one view to the exclusion of others?
A. The Stakes
If abortion rose to prominence as a political flash point because of its association
with the modern family at the expense of traditional family values, so too is assisted
reproduction associated with modernity and the technological manipulation of the
sacred (the production of a child) to serve individualistic ends.  The Catholic Church
emphasizes exactly this perspective in its opposition to IVF.228  At the same time, of
course, traditional women see fulfillment in terms of their roles as wives and mothers,
and infertility thus affects them profoundly.  As the age of marriage rises across the
United States,229 the interest in assisted reproduction is likely to increase as well.  The
question will then become on what terms.
Kristin Luker’s characterization of the abortion debate provides a clue as to how
the battle lines are likely to be drawn.  She observed that:
Women who oppose abortion and seek to make it officially un-
available are declaring, both practically and symbolically, that
women’s reproductive roles should be given social primacy . . .
when personhood is bestowed on the embryo, women’s nonrepro-
ductive roles are made secondary to their reproductive roles.230
Underlying this description is not just the recreation of the gender role fights of the
eighties, but of the idea of agency that underlay them.  For traditional women, repro-
duction is something that follows from sexuality and imposes order on family life. 
For modern women, it is something to be chosen and managed.
227 See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Adoption in the Age of Reproductive Technology, 2004
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 393, 428–32 (recounting pain and feelings of powerlessness of infertile
couples).
228 Lyria Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal Responses to Technological Change: The
Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 505, 522–23 (2005).
229 See Davis, supra note 21, at 281.
230 LUKER, supra note 46, at 200.
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Applying these same ideas to embryo donation changes the terms of the debate. 
For modern women, IVF allows older women to determine the terms of reproduction,
to go forward with gametes they choose, to control the timing of the process.231  While
infertility treatments are costly, painful and emotionally draining,232 they are also tied
to a determination to produce a certain kind of family, even if the meaning of that
family differs from one person to the next.  Embryo donation, in contrast, can be rec-
onciled with the idea of submission to God’s will.  It can be thought of in terms of
obligation rather than choice, of a fated match between parents and child rather than a
managed one.  In practical terms, it may be less expensive than new rounds of IVF and
it can be reconciled even with religious beliefs opposed to IVF itself.233  The growth
of embryo donation thus opens the door to new meanings for assisted reproduction,
for the benefit of new constituencies, who increase the demand for different laws.
This in turn may increase the fight to control the meanings of the resulting
legislation.
B. The Laws
The conflict between the ideals underlying ART—individualism, technological
sophistication, gender equality, determination to produce the best possible children—
and the emerging ideals underlying embryo adoption is greatest at the symbolic level. 
Moreover, the clash between the two ideals is not parallel.  Pro-choice states such as
California actively facilitate embryo transfers234 while pro-life states such as Georgia
hail its “embryo adoption” legislation because it addresses IVF only in pro-life terms.235 
As embryo fundamentalists seek more influence, ART regulation might proceed in
multiple, potentially overlapping or potentially exclusionary, directions, which we
briefly outline below.
1. Segregated Networks
First, it is entirely possible that new legislation will facilitate further development
of separate networks for the provision of fertility services, with radically different
moral and ethical views about ART.  Clinics with fundamentally different philoso-
phies currently exist in California.  One need only compare Rainbow Flag Health
231 For intriguing commentary on the idea of “planned parenthood,” see Susan Frelich
Appleton, “Planned Parenthood”: Adoption, Assisted Reproduction, and the New Ideal Family,
1 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 85 (1999).
232 Peter K. Rydel, Redefining the Right to Reproduce: Asserting Infertility as a Disability
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 63 ALB. L. REV. 593, 594 (1999).
233 The Catholic Church has even reserved judgment on embryo adoption as a lesser evil.
See discussion supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text.
234 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125315 (2009).
235 See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-41(d) (2009).
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Services236 in Oakland, CA with Nightlight Christian Adoptions in Anaheim, CA.237 
Rainbow Flag affirmatively reaches out to the gay and lesbian community,238 while
Nightlight Christian Adoptions is deeply rooted in a more conservative Christian out-
look that focuses on married couples as its primary constituency.239
Second, regulation might facilitate fertility tourism.  If states create distinctly dif-
ferent background laws, encouraging donation for research in some states (California)
and donation for reproduction in others, subsidizing some programs and harassing or
limiting others, the net result may be specialized networks by state.  California already
has clinics that cater to foreign fertility tourists seeking a more supportive legal envi-
ronment;240 Americans might choose the clinic of their choice based on the state’s
legal infrastructure.
Fertility tourism is already possible, of course, and India has become a desirable
international destination.241  Today’s world, which involves widespread availability
and negligible oversight for those who can afford fertility services may continue,
perhaps with new clinics becoming even less likely to open in hostile states; con-
versely, national legislation forbidding embryo destruction could limit the practical
differences among states.
Third, there may be practical convergence.  To date, evangelicals have been less
likely to use IVF, partly because of the expense and partly because of younger average
ages of childbearing.242  If embryo adoption were to become more widespread, it might
create new constituencies for IVF itself.  Even though some religions oppose IVF
altogether, most Protestant denominations do not yet have fully developed views on the
subject.243  Embryo adoption, which remains unusual today, might become a more com-
mon response to infertility, and ultimately increase support for ART more generally.
The Louisiana244 and Georgia245 statutes discussed above provide some evidence
of convergence as well as ideological posturing.  In Louisiana, the industry effectively
236 Rainbow Flag Health Services, http://www.gayspermbank.com/ (last visited Apr. 17,
2010).
237 Nightlight Christian Adoptions, http://www.nightlight.org/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
238 Rainbow Flag Health Services, supra note 236.
239 Nightlight Christian Adoptions, Adoption Agency, http://www.nightlight.org/about
-christian-adoption-agency/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2010); NIGHTLIGHT CHRISTIAN ADOPTIONS,
ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR DOMESTIC ADOPTIONS (2010), http://www.nightlight.org/
downloads/nightlight-ca-domestic.pdf.
240 Rainbow Flag Health Services, supra note 236.
241 Shilpa Kannan, Regulators Eye India’s Surrogacy Sector, BRITISH BROADCASTING
CORP., Mar. 18, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7935768.stm.
242 Colleen Neary, Hall v. Nalco Co.: Protection For Women Unable to Conceive Naturally,
40 U. TOL. L. REV. 1021, 1025–26 (2009); David M. Smolin, Does Bioethics Provide Answers?:
Secular and Religious Bioethics and Our Procreative Future, 55 CUMB. L. REV. 473, 508 (2005).
243 Cynthia B. Cohen, Protestant Perspectives on the Uses of the New Reproductive
Technologies, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 135, 135–37 (2002).
244 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:130–131 (2009).
245 See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-41(d) (2009); Id. § 19-8-42(a).
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accepted recognition of the special status of embryos as the price of approval for state
authorization of IVF.246  In Georgia, on the other hand, the pro-life forces dropped the
more extreme language on the status of embryos in order to enact legislation provid-
ing for embryo adoption, with the symbolically important authorization of parentage
decrees from adoption courts.247  The result in both states has been greater legal clarity
that makes embryo transfers more likely.
2. Constitutional Clashes?
The laws that have been adopted to date appear to stop short of direct conflict
with established IVF practices or the kind of infringement on reproductive autonomy
that would prompt litigation.  Even the limitations in statutes like those in Texas248
and Florida249 permitting embryo adoption by a “husband and wife” have not been
tested.  Nonetheless, such prohibitions on access to reproductive services based on
marital status might run afoul of some existing state civil rights laws, and may be
unconstitutional under the federal constitution. 250  Attempts to limit reproductive
liberties would become more likely to be challenged if they:251
a) Mandated implantation of all embryos, even over the objections of the
progenitors.  Such a requirement would be inconsistent with existing state
cases on the disposition of extra embryos in contexts in which husbands
and wives have disagreed, and appear inconsistent with older Supreme
Court cases such as Skinner v. Oklahoma252 and more recent decisions
in the abortion context.  Requiring progenitors who will not or cannot
implant their embryos to allow others to do so would clearly intrude on
reproductive autonomy.  Conversely, if a state were to provide notice
246 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:125.
247 See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-41(d).
248 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.704(a) (Vernon 2009).
249 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11(2009).
250 See North Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. Superior Court, 189 P.3d 959
(Cal. 2008); CAHN, supra note 5; Judith F. Darr, Accessing Reproductive Technologies:
Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18 (2008); see also
Bebe J. Anderson, Lesbians, Gays, and People Living with HIV: Facing and Fighting Barriers
to Assisted Reproduction, 15 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 451, 467–74 (2009) (discussing various
potential constitutional rights at issue when gays and lesbians are unable to access assisted
reproductive technology); Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children from the Marriage
Movement: The Case Against Marital Status Discrimination in Adoption and Assisted
Reproduction, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 305 (2006) (analysis of state laws and the effect of the
emphasis on marriage).
251 We would like to thank Josh Marrone for some of these suggestions.
252 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); see, e.g., VICTORIA F. NOURSE, IN RECKLESS
HANDS: SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA AND THE NEAR TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN EUGENICS (2008);
Sonia M. Suter, The “Repugnance” Lens of Gonzales v. Carhart and Other Theories of
Reproductive Rights: Evaluating Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 76 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1514 (2008).
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to progenitors at the time they create the embryos that the state will favor
implantation in the event of a dispute between the progenitors, then the
provision of notice would strengthen the argument for the statute’s con-
stitutionality, at least where one of the progenitors wishes to produce a
child.  At the same time, the retroactive application of such laws to
couples who signed agreements to the contrary before the legislation was
passed may also raise constitutional issues about procedural, as well as
substantive, due process.
b) Prohibit the creation of extra embryos.  The potential enactment of statutes
modeled after those in Italy, which limit the number of embryos created
and requires couples to implant all of the embryos they create,253 raises
various constitutional issues.  To date, the focus has been on the existence
of a constitutionally guaranteed right to procreation.  As the debate be-
tween John Robertson and Radhika Rao254 shows, the precise contours
of such a right have yet to be articulated.  Such a law could result in
extensive litigation, and the outcome might depend on whether:
• The U.S. Supreme Court would intervene in the issue at all or leave
the matter to the states.  The most recent abortion cases indicate a high
degree of deference to state legislatures, and the court might decide
that the determination of embryo status rests with the states, at least
where it applies to the determination of an embryo’s status outside
of the human body that poses no direct conflict with another person’s
bodily integrity.255
• The legislation justifies a limit on the number of embryos created
based solely on the moral status of the embryo irrespective of the
individual patient’s circumstances, or permits consideration of other
factors such as the patient’s health, age, or the likelihood of repro-
ductive success.
• The legislation ties determination of the number of embryos that
can be created to the number to be implanted.  Doctors could easily
circumvent restrictions by implanting embryos at a time or under
circumstances unlikely to lead to pregnancy.
253 New Fertility Law Divides Italy, BUZZLE, Dec. 12, 2003, http://www.buzzle.com/
editorials/12-12-2003-48530.asp.
254 See Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive
Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457 (2008).
255 See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S. 230 (2006). For
an analysis of the constitutional implications of restrictions on reproduction, see I. Glenn
Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1140 (2008);
Elizabeth Price Foley, Human Cloning and the Right to Reproduce, 65 ALB. L. REV. 625,
627–38 (2002); John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76
VA. L. REV. 437, 477 (1990); Sarah A. Weber, Dismantling the Dictated Moral Code:
Modifying Louisiana’s In Vitro Fertilization Statutes to Protect Patients’ Procreative Liberty,
51 LOY. L. REV. 549, 578–79 (2005).
1052 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 18:1015
c) Progenitor criminal liability for the destruction of embryos.  The status
of a law that required all progenitors who object to implantation of their
embryos to keep them frozen indefinitely raises a complex series of issues. 
Many couples undergoing fertility treatments do not want more than a
certain number of children and would object vehemently to their genetic
offspring being raised by someone else.  Consistent with the special
respect they might accord their potential children, they may well object
to indefinite storage of the embryos.  The question of what deference
the state owes the views of such progenitors, which may reflect the pro-
genitors’ individual religious or ethical views, is an unexplored issue
underlying the debate.  A criminal prosecution for “pulling the plug” on
a freezer or taking embryos out of state for thawing and disposal would
squarely present the issues; a request to a Louisiana court to enjoin inter-
ference for plans to thaw and bury embryos might raise similar issues.
d) Rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose: A state regulation re-
quiring the indefinite storage of frozen embryos over the objections of
the progenitors may be challenged on the ground that it lacks a rational
relationship to a legitimate state purpose.256  Conversely, a state law pro-
hibiting the transfer of frozen embryos out of state or to jurisdictions that
permit their destruction may violate the right to travel.
CONCLUSION
If reproductive technology is to move forward, then the political conundrum
for the future of embryo regulation is determining the rights of embryo progenitors
and recipients.  If the embryo is a child, then adoption laws apply, but those laws
ordinarily allow progenitors to change their mind after the child’s birth and require
adoptive parents to submit to a home study by the state.  As California demonstrates,
however, it is possible to reach agreement on a legal infrastructure that allows embryo
transfers to go forward without resolving global disagreements on embryo status.257 
The question is whether that will be enough for those invested in the ideological
rhetoric of abortion politics.
256 See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 598 (1988).
257 The American Society for Reproductive Medicine, which is an organization of those
providing fertility services, labels embryo donation a “medical,” rather than a “legal” pro-
cedure. See ASRM Ethics Committee, American Society for Reproductive Medicine: Defining
Embryo Donation, 92 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1818, 1819 (2009); ASRM, 2008 Guidelines
for Gamete and Embryo Donation: A Practice Committee Report, 90 FERTILITY & STERILITY
S30 (2008).
